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Abstract
Representation is central to contemporary theorizing about the
mind/brain. But the nature of representation—both in the mind/brain
and more generally—is a source of ongoing controversy. One way of
categorizing representational types is to distinguish between the ana-
log and the digital: the received view is that analog representations
vary smoothly, while digital representations vary in a step-wise man-
ner. I argue that this characterization is inadequate to account for the
ways in which representation is used in cognitive science; in its place,
I suggest an alternative taxonomy. I will defend and extend David
Lewis’s account of analog and digital representation, distinguishing
analog from continuous representation, as well as digital from discrete
representation. I will argue that the distinctions available in this four-
fold account accord with representational features of theoretical inter-
est in cognitive science more usefully than the received analog/digital
dichotomy.
1 Introduction
Cognitive science is committed to at least two ideas: that the mind/brain is a
computer, and that the mind/brain operates on representations. Von Eckardt
(1993) characterizes these as the substantive assumptions of the field. Yet rep-
resentation is not an unproblematic notion: serious theoretical and empirical
questions about representation drive current research in cognitive science.
The problem of intentionality has commanded much attention in philosophy,
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and in psychology, significant effort has gone into characterizing representa-
tions thought to underlie various psychological phenomena.
One fact about representation that has been noted but insufficiently in-
terrogated is that the form of a representation determines both the kinds of
things that can be represented and the ways in which that representation
can be manipulated. The received analog/digital dichotomy is one way of
distinguishing such forms: some representations vary smoothly, others vary
step-wise. But examples from the psychological and computational literature
make it clear that ‘analog’ is not, in fact, synonymous with ‘continuous’, and
‘digital’ is not synonymous with ‘discrete’; thus, the analog and digital labels
must be tracking something else.
In this essay, I will argue that we can refine the received dichotomy along
lines originally suggested by Lewis (1971): analog representation is distinct
from continuous representation, and digital representation is distinct from
discrete representation. I will first examine some of the accounts of analog
and digital representation found in the philosophical literature. A proposal for
a more refined characterization of representational types follows. I will then
argue for the adoption of this taxonomy because it both clarifies the essential
aspects of representational types that are explanatorily relevant to cognitive
scientists, and it provides researchers across the constitutive disciplines of
cognitive science a unified framework for discussing representation.
Before we begin, however, I will introduce two terms to ease the discus-
sion. Let a representational medium be the physical substrate in which a
representation is instantiated. Let a representational format be the structure
of the system of representation, regardless of the medium. So, for example, I
might take an amount of sand as representing some quantity Q. In this case,
the representational medium is sand. If I represented the quantity by the
total number of grains of sand, then—assuming grains of sand do not come
in fractions—the representational format would be discrete, and isomorphic
to the whole numbers (i.e. Q ∈ N). On the other hand, if I represented the
quantity by the weight of the sand, then, depending on the range of numbers
I wanted to represent, the representational format would be either continu-
ous or discrete. For example, if I have several tons of sand for representing a
number between 0 and 1, it might be most expedient to consider the repre-
sentational format to be continuous, ranging over all real numbers between 0
and 1 (i.e. Q ∈ R, 0 ≤ Q ≤ 1). On the other hand, if I’m representing a range
of numbers with a small amount of sand, it might be better to consider the
format to be discrete, broken up into, say, hundredths, with some margin of
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error used for rounding (i.e. Q ∈ {x : x = n
100
, n ∈ N}). Thus, the represen-
tational format may be discrete or continuous, although the representational
medium (grains of sand) is discrete.
2 Previous Accounts
Goodman (1968) was perhaps the first philosopher to analyze the so-called
analog/digital distinction. Although he acknowledges possibilities to the con-
trary, his account is essentially the received view, in which ‘digital’ is syn-
onymous with ‘discrete’, and ‘analog’ is synonymous with ‘continuous’:
Plainly, a digital system has nothing special to do with digits,
or an analog system with analogy. . . . Since the misleading tra-
ditional terms ‘analog’ and ‘digital’ are unlikely to be discarded,
perhaps the best course is to try to dissociate them from analogy
and digits and a good deal of loose talk, and distinguish them in
terms of density and differentiation—though these are not oppo-
sites. (Goodman, 1968, 160)
Here, the basic distinction between a digital and an analog representational
scheme is that a digital scheme is differentiated or discrete, while an analog
scheme is continuous or dense. Goodman was also concerned with whether
analog representation was a matter of the representational medium, the rep-
resentational format, or both; we will discuss these issues below. In any case,
it is clear that Goodman equates ‘analog’ with ‘continuous’.
In response to Goodman, Lewis (1971) offers an alternative account, tak-
ing issue with the claim that digital systems have nothing to do with digits,
and that analog systems have nothing to do with analogy. First, Lewis claims
that differentiated representations can be analog in some circumstances. For
example, an analog computer might represent a positive integer by the resis-
tance in ohms along a particular part of a circuit. According to Goodman,
this would only count as an analog representation if the resistance was set
by a continuously-variable resistor; Lewis contends that using a series of
single-ohm resistors, along with a device to bypass the unneeded resistors,
would count as an analog representation. The number is still represented by
the amount of resistance, but instead of varying continuously, the resistance
varies in unit steps. So according to Lewis, whether the representation varies
continuously or in discrete is irrelevant to its being analog; what counts is that
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the representation does its work via a quantity. Thus, analog representation
is not necessarily dense in Goodman’s sense. Lewis’s alternative formulation
is that “analog representation of numbers is representation of numbers by
physical magnitudes that are either primitive or almost primitive,” (Lewis,
1971, p. 163, original italics) where “primitive or almost primitive” refers to
terms in an appropriate reconstruction of the language of physics (such as
ohms).
Lewis then gives an account of digital representation, whereby “we can
define digital representation of numbers as representation of numbers by dif-
ferentiated multidigital magnitudes” (Lewis, 1971, p. 165, original italics).
Thus, a digital representation uses more than one digit, where both the
tokens of the digits and their values are differentiated. An example is an
odometer with six digits: each digit can take one of ten tokens (the numerals
‘0’ through ‘9’), each of which is discrete and differentiated, and the sequence
of all six digits is used to represent a number in a systematic way (i.e. the first
digit on the right represents the number of units, the second digit represents
the number of tens, etc., and the sum of all six of these quantities is taken to
be the value of the number represented). This is in contrast to Goodman’s
analysis of digital, which only requires differentiation (i.e. discreteness).
Haugeland (1981) weighs in on the analog/digital distinction from a dif-
ferent perspective, although his account is ultimately allied with the received
view. Haugeland claims that the primary guide for distinguishing analog
and digital representations is the reliability of the physical reading (or writ-
ing) procedure accessing (or producing) those representations. Specifically,
Haugeland understands a digital device to be one in which the tokens of
a set of specified types can be written and read reliably and with absolute
certainty; analog devices, in contrast, are those in which “the procedures for
the write-read cycle are approximation procedures—that is, ones which can
‘come close’ to perfect success,” (Haugeland, 1981, p. 83). Consequently, a
representation is analog if and only if it is continuous (or seems continuous
to the user of the representation; (Katz, 2008) defends this interpretation
of Haugeland’s account), because real-world continuous representations only
allow for approximate read-write cycles; mutatis mutandis for digital and dis-
crete representation. This immediately discounts Lewis’s single-ohm resistor
example, about which Haugeland states “I think it’s clearly digital—just as
digital as a stack of silver dollars, even when the croupier ‘counts’ them by
height” (Haugeland, 1981, p. 80).
Intuitions clearly differ among all three authors, and adjudication is ob-
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viously not an empirical matter. Choosing any particular account of rep-
resentational types should be a matter of deciding which is most useful for
taxonomizing the representations we care about. In particular, given the cru-
cial role that representation plays in cognitive science, and given that ideas
about representation in cognitive science draw from both psychological and
computational theorizing, we should choose the one that most fruitfully al-
lows us to think about how representations in the natural computational
system of the mind/brain relate to representations in the artificial computa-
tional systems we have engineered. In the next two sections, I will argue that
a modified version of Lewis’s account fits this bill.
3 Analog and Continuous
The term ‘analog’, in the sense I am concerned with, originates in computer
engineering. Early computing machines employed both continuous and non-
continuous representations, using many varieties of mechanical, electrome-
chanical, and electronic media (Mindell, 2002). As digital computing ma-
chines became more prevalent, the label ‘analog’ came to stand for those
machines that used a continuous representation of one sort or another. ‘Ana-
log electronics’ now typically refers to electronics systems that are analyzed
with continuous variables; hence the first part of the received analog/digital
distinction.
Another sense of ‘analog’ representation can be found in experimental
psychology. This sense is invoked in debates about whether mental imagery
is analog or propositional. Of central concern in these debates is how to best
interpret data from human performance on certain tasks involving spatial
reasoning. Examples include remembering the location of landmarks on a
map, or making similarity judgments on two objects, one of which is presented
in a rotated form. To get a sense of what psychologists mean by analog
representation, we will look at the latter task—known as mental rotation—
in a bit of detail.
The seminal finding in the mental rotation literature is that of Shepard
and Metzler (1971). Participants in this experiment were presented with two
line drawings of three-dimensional objects. The portrayed objects were ei-
ther identical, or one was a mirror image of the other. Additionally, one of
the depicted objects was rotated relative to the other, where the amount of
rotation varied between trials. Upon presentation of a pair of objects, par-
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Figure 1: Shepard-Metzler objects. The top two are ‘same’; the bottom two
are ‘different’.
ticipants were asked to determine whether the two objects were the same or
different, where “same” means that one could rotate one of the objects to
exactly match the other (top row in Figure 1), and “different” means that
no such rotation is possible (bottom row in Figure 1).
Shepard and Metzler found that the time it takes for a person to make a
decision of “same” or “different” is directly proportional to the amount (in
degrees) that the two objects are rotated relative to one another: in short, the
larger the rotation, the longer the response time. Shepard later argued that
these results suggest that analog representation underlies mental rotation
abilities:
By an analogical or analog process I mean just this: a process in
which the intermediate internal states have a natural one-to-one
correspondence to appropriate intermediate states in the external
world. Thus, to imagine an object such as a complex molecule ro-
tated into a different orientation is to perform an analog process in
that half way through the process, the internal state corresponds
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to the external object in an orientation half way between the ini-
tial and final orientations. And this correspondence has the very
real meaning that, at this half-way point, the person carrying out
the process will be especially fast in discriminatively responding
to the external presentation of the corresponding external struc-
ture in exactly that spatial orientation. The intermediate states
of a logical computation do not in general have this property.
Thus, a digital computer may calculate the coordinates of a ro-
tated structure by performing a matrix multiplication. But the
intermediate states of this row-into-column calculation will at no
point correspond to—or place the machine in readiness for—an
intermediate orientation of the external object. (Shepard, 1978,
135)
It should be noted that, although Shepard mentions analog processes here,
the point applies to analog representation as well: “We have taken this de-
pendence of transformation time on the extent of the transformation as sup-
portive of the notion that the mental transformation is carried out over a
path that is the internal analog of the corresponding physical transformation
of the external object” (Shepard, 1978, 134).
Experimental psychologists have adopted Shepard’s notion of analog rep-
resentation, and argued that it provides the best explanation of the available
data. Recent fMRI research supports the argument for analog representation
in another way: the amount of activity in brain regions thought to be in-
volved in mental rotation is directly proportional to the amount of mental
rotation. So, the larger the rotation, the greater the response time, and the
greater the brain activity in specific, rotation-related regions (Zacks, 2008).
I have mentioned these two uses of ‘analog’—the computer engineer’s
and the experimental psychologist’s—not in order to show how they are
different, but to suggest a way to understand analog representation that
includes both. Note that nothing in Shepard’s discussion implies that, by
analog he just means continuous. Rather, he refers to a relationship between
the thing represented and the representation itself (in his case, the degrees
of rotation required to manipulate an object, and some property of a mental
representation of that object).
The proposal I offer is this: contrary to Goodman and Haugeland, analog
representation does not refer to continuity in the representational medium
or the representational format. Rather, analog representation is represen-
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tation in which the represented quantity covaries with the representational
medium, regardless of whether the representational medium is continuous or
discrete. This is similar to Lewis’s definition of analog representation, but
without the requirement that the medium of representation be “primitive or
almost primitive.” As long as the quantity doing the representing increases
(or decreases) in a systematic way with what is being represented, then the
representation is analog. So, for example, we could represent the numbers of
days that have passed since my birthday by a number of marbles in a jar: as
the number of days increases, so do the number of marbles. The marbles are
then an analog representation, even though “number of marbles” is clearly
not an almost-primitive physical magnitude.
We can put this characterization more formally as follows. A representa-
tion R of a number Q is analog if and only if:
1. there is some property P of R (the representational medium) such that
the quantity or amount of P maps onto Q; and
2. as Q increases (or decreases) by an amount d, P increases (or decreases)
as a linear function of Q+ d (or Q− d).
More succinctly, R is an analog representation of Q if and only if P is a
property of R and P = f(Q), where f is linear. In the case of Lewis’s resistor
example, as well as more typical examples of analog representation in analog
computers, P is resistance or voltage, Q is the quantity to be represented,
and f is the identity function. In the case of mental rotation, P is some
hypothesized (assumedly neural) property of a mental representation, Q is
degrees of rotation, and based on the response time data, f is some linear
function. Note that, although we know that the relationship between response
time (RT ) and degrees of rotation is approximately RT = Q
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+1 (Shepard and
Metzler, 1971), we do not know the precise relationship between RT and the
hypothesized analog representation. Nevertheless, the relationship between
RT and degrees of rotation is taken as evidence of an analog representation
(to criticize this inference is to criticize a basic methodological assumption
driving experimental psychology). We can thus assume that the relationship
between the hypothesized analog representation and RT is also linear.1
1For example, it takes approximately one second for a person to make a similarity judg-
ment about two objects that are not rotated with respect to one another at all. Although
no mental rotation is necessary, there is a certain amount of “cognitive overhead,” per-
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This definition captures other examples of so-called analog representa-
tion, except that continuity is not necesary—the representational medium or
the representational format can be continuous or discrete. Thus, the analog
computer is no less analog if the voltages of its components come in small
units, and mental rotation is no less analog if it turns out that people can
only mentally rotate objects in half-degree steps. Although many examples
of analog representation use continuous media or formats, this is not what
makes them interesting; rather, it is the relationship that they maintain with
what they represent, as I have characterized here.
I have been discussing continuity in this essay without precisely charac-
terizing it; doing so would be both beyond the scope—and unnecessary for
the argument—of this essay. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning a few brief
points about continuity and continuous representation. First, it should be
clear that a continuous representation is simply one that takes on continuous
values. These values may vary across either the representational medium or
the representational format. Second, pace Goodman, continuity is different
than density. Density is the property of having an element between any other
two: the rational numbers are a clear example. However, because there are
gaps among them (e.g. pi and
√
2), the rational numbers are not continuous.
In this section I have presented a distinction between analog and con-
tinuous representation, and argued for its adoption on the grounds that it
provides a more useful way to talk about representations. Some aspects of
representation concern a particular relationship between representation and
thing represented (e.g. mental rotation); other aspects concern whether val-
ues can vary continuously or not. My proposal amounts to simply noticing
this difference, and making the relevant distinction. In the next section, I will
do the same for digital and discrete representation.
4 Digital and Discrete
Similar to ‘analog’ and ‘continuous’, the terms ‘digital’ and ‘discrete’ are syn-
onymous under the received analog/digital dichotomy. In this section, I will
argue that one can usefully distinguish between digital and discrete represen-
tation. The basic idea is again due to Lewis (1971): a digital representation
haps involved in visual orientation and response initiation. But this overhead is assumed
to be constant with respect to the manipulation of the analog representation necessary for
performing the task.
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is one in which a number is represented via its digits, and a discrete rep-
resentation is one that is not continuous. The upshot of this refinement is
parallel to that of the previous section, in that this distinction is useful for
characterizing the representations used among the various areas of cognitive
science.
Digital representation is the scheme we normally use to represent num-
bers. More explicitly, it is the representation of a number consisting of: a
series of digits, where digit just means a numeral in a specific place; and a
base, which is used to interpret the relative value of digits. So, for example, to
represent the number three hundred forty eight in base 10, we use the three-
digit series ‘348’, which has ‘3’ in the hundreds place, ‘4’ in the tens place,
and ‘8’ in the ones place—the value is (3× 102) + (4× 101) + (8× 100). More
generally, a digital representation ‘dndn−1 . . . d1d0’ in base b is interpreted as
(dn × bn) + (dn−1 × bn−1) + . . .+ (d1 × b1) + (d0 × b0).
Our familiarity with digital representation can obscure its actual com-
plexity. Notice that ‘3’ cannot be understood as a component of a digital
representation except in the context of its place. Without this context, ‘3’
could represent 300 (as in the example above), 3,000, or just 3. Worse, with-
out knowing the base, ‘3’ could stand for virtually any number (e.g. in base
four, ‘30’ = 12). Additionally, the base dictates how many numerals can be
used for each digit: in base n we have exactly n numerals. With these con-
siderations in place, we can now precisely define digital representation. To
wit:
1. a series of digits, each of which is a numeral in a specific place within
the series; and
2. a base, which determines the value of each digit as a function of its
place, as well as the number of possible numerals that can be used for
each digit.
The value of a digital representation is then determined using the formula
given above.
Nothing about this characterization is controversial: it is just the way we
typically represent numbers. However, I claim that the term ‘digital’ should
be reserved only for representations of this type, rather than discrete repre-
sentation more generally, as the received view would have it. Digital repre-
sentation is a variety of discrete representation, but the converse is not true.
To see this, let us examine discrete representation in more detail.
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Whereas a digital representation necessarily represents a number, a dis-
crete representation has no such restrictions. To be precise, an individual rep-
resentation is not by itself discrete; rather, it is the representational scheme
of which it is a part that is discrete. The essential requirement for being a dis-
crete representational scheme (which both Goodman (1968) and Haugeland
(1981) capture in their accounts of digital representation) is that represen-
tations are distinct from other representations in the same representational
scheme, and there are gaps between the possible representations. For exam-
ple, letters of the alphabet, written words, and poker chips are all discrete,
non-digital representations. In these cases, the representation is either wholly
present or it is not—half of a letter does not count as a letter. Furthermore,
there is no representation between any two representations that are adjacent
according to some ordering. There is no letter between ‘a’ and ‘b’, and if
we sort English words by length and then alphabetically, there is no word
between ‘cam’ and ‘can’.
Although a minor point, it should also be noted that—contra Goodman—
discrete representations can be dense. The most obvious example is the repre-
sentation of positive rational numbers by fractions. Again, this is so familiar
that it is worth making explicit. The rational number one half is represented
by two digital representations separated by a ‘/’: i.e. ‘1/2’. Thus, a fraction
is a discrete representation, consisting of two digital representations and a
special symbol. If we try to order fractions by the values they represent,
we find that there is always another fraction between any two; this is pre-
cisely the property of being dense. However, if we order them as follows: ‘1/1’,
‘1/2’, ‘2/1’, ‘1/3’, ‘2/2’, ‘3/1’, ‘1/4’, ‘2/3’, . . . , then there is no representation
between successive pairs. So this is both a discrete and a dense representa-
tional scheme. In fact, this property is precisely what separates dense from
continuous representational schemes.
The most important reason for separating digital from discrete represen-
tation is to make clear the peculiarities of digital computers—particularly if
we are to treat them as models of cognition. Digital computers are not digital
simply because they are discrete, but because their representations are digi-
tal in the sense I have presented here. Space prohibits a detailed description
of digital computation, but it must be noted that an essential aspect of such
computation is that it uses so-called digital logic. This is the lowest level of
abstraction used in designing digital computers, where components operate
on strings of individual bits (at levels lower than digital logic, one is dealing
with hardware and electrical engineering). These strings of bits are inter-
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preted as binary representations of numbers, and operations on these strings
rely on the fact that they are composed of digits in the sense articulated
above. For example, an adder might determine the sum of two numbers by
adding them digit-by-digit, using the same algorithm children are taught.2
In the case of machine instructions, certain digits will encode a particular
operation, while other digits in the instruction encode addresses or registers
in memory.
Two simplified examples will help illustrate this point. In digital com-
puters, characters in ASCII format are represented as numbers, which are in
turn represented by seven binary digits. Also, all uppercase letters are 32 less
than their lowercase counterparts. The letter ‘K’, for example, is represented
by the number 75, which is ‘1001011’ in binary. The lowercase ‘k’ is repre-
sented by 107, or ‘1101011’. So, a digital component that converts uppercase
letters to lowercase letters could simply add 32 to the uppercase letter. This
would work by changing the second digit from the left from a ‘0’ to a ‘1’,
because 32 is ‘0100000’ in binary. In other words, this component would turn
the digit in the “32s place” to a ‘1’.
Another example is accessing memory locations. A (very) simple digital
computer could have four separate devices (call them chips) for storing bytes
of data, each of which has eight locations for a particular byte of memory, for
a total of 32 units of memory. When the computer is given an instruction to
read a particular unit—an address between 0 and 31—a natural way to access
the memory is to use the most significant places of the address to determine
which chip should be accessed, and then use the remaining digits to fetch
the particular byte in that chip. In other words, each chip has locations 0
through 7, and the chips are numbered 0 through 3. To access location 6
in chip 2, we would use address ‘10110’: the first two digits (on the left)
indicate that the address is stored in chip 2 (10 in binary); the last three
indicate that it is location 6 that we want. The programmer, of course, does
not need to know these details: as far as she is concerned, there are simply 32
bytes of memory. But those wishing to understand the computer at a lower
level must attend to the digital nature of the representations involved. Now,
modern computers do not have specialized components for turning uppercase
letters into lowercase ones, and memory is usually measured in the gigabytes.
Nevertheless, these toy examples illustrates the point: digital computers use
2Strictly speaking, the computer operates on binary representations of numbers, and
not numbers themselves. For the sake of brevity, I have left this qualification out.
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digital representations qua digital : their representations and operations take
advantage of—and can only be understood using—the special structure of
numbers represented via digits.
5 Discussion
I have argued that the received analog/digital distinction comes apart in two
ways: we can distinguish between analog and continuous representation, and
we can distinguish between digital and discrete representation. One obvious
objection is that these are just distinctions without a useful difference: after
all, we have gotten along quite well using the received view, and it may
be futile to make the distinctions proposed here (recall the quotation from
Goodman (1968)). Or, one could argue that the synonymies assumed within
the received view really are synonymies, and that by using ‘digital’, one may
as well have used ‘discrete’ (as Haugeland (1981) assumes). In response, it
seems best to point to instances where the received view is misleading or
discounts useful representational types that one can make using the four-
fold view I propose. I have already mentioned how theorizing about mental
rotation benefits from one half of the story (the distinction between analog
and continuous representation); in the following section, I will discuss some
further examples that can benefit from the proposed analysis.
Before proceeding to particulars, however, it is worth considering a more
general point about the potentially misleading use of ‘analog’ as synonymous
with ‘continuous’. If some phenomenon of interest is continuous, describing it
as analog presupposes that the phenomenon is a representation, which may
not be the case. It is an empirical question whether all of the continuous
phenomena in neural systems are actually representations, even if they are
continuous at some level of theoretical description. Similarly, the ‘digital’-
‘discrete’ synonymy also presupposes representation, when all that may be
of interest is discreteness. Again, in neural systems, it may be quite useful to
characterize action potentials or ion channels as discrete phenomena, with-
out thereby declaring them representations (as one would by calling them
digital). Saddled with the received view, however, we cannot usefully make
these distinctions: the terms ‘analog’ and ‘digital’, coming as they do from
computer science, imply that representations are at hand. They may not be.
The best example of what I claim we should avoid comes from Eliasmith
(2000), who proposed an answer to whether the brain is analog or digital. Us-
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ing the received view, he argues that: the brain uses ‘digital’ representations;
the brain processes information; information used by the brain cannot be
infinite; ‘analog’ representations require infinite information, and thus can-
not used by the brain; therefore the brain is digital. If this is true, are the
researchers studying mental rotation fundamentally misguided? And what
kind of number system is the brain using? Is it binary, like contemporary
digital computers, or does it use a decimal system, like some of the first com-
puters? Further, might the neuroscientists gain some crucial insight into the
functioning of a digital system like the brain by studying how other digital
computer systems operate?
The problem here is obvious. Being reasonably charitable, Eliasmith prob-
ably does not mean to claim that the brain is like a digital computer (and
I am not sure what he would think about mental rotation). So why use the
misleading terms? By insisting on the ambiguity inherent in the received
view, one must defend Eliasmith by insisting that both ‘analog’ and ‘digital’
have different senses: sometimes they mean one thing, sometimes another.
I claim that it is much simpler to use ‘discrete’ and ‘continuous’ in cases
like Eliasmith’s, and use ‘digital’ and ‘analog’ in cases that merit their more
refined definitions given above.
Another example coming from the cognitive science literature discusses
representations of quantities in rats, pigeons, and monkeys (Gallistel et al.,
2006). Gallistel and his colleagues review data suggesting that, when re-
membering some interval of time, the variability of the error in the time
remembered increases as the interval increases:
The fact that the memory for numerosity exhibits scalar vari-
ability suggests that numerosity is represented in the brains of
nonverbal vertebrates like rats, pigeons, and monkeys by men-
tal magnitudes, that is, by real numbers, rather than by discrete
symbols like words or bit patterns. When a device such as an ana-
log computer represents numerosities by different voltage levels,
noise in the voltages leads to confusion between nearby numbers.
If, by contrast, a device represents countable quantity by count-
able (that is, discrete) symbols, as digital computers and written
number systems do, then one does not expect to see the kind
of variability seen [earlier]. For example, the bit-pattern symbol
for 15 is 01111 whereas for 16 it is 10000. Although the numbers
are adjacent, the discrete binary symbols for them differ in all
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five bits. Jitter in the bits (uncertainty about whether a given bit
was 0 or 1) would make 14 (01110), 13 (01101), 11 (01011), and
7 (00111), all equally and maximally likely to be confused with
15 because the confusion arises in each case from the misread-
ing of one bit.. . . Thus, the nature of the variability in a remem-
bered target number implies that what is being remembered is a
magnitude—a real number. (Gallistel et al., 2006, 252)
Gallistel, like Eliasmith, assumes that the received digital/analog dichotomy
provides the only option for distinguishing representational types. One pos-
sibility consistent with these results is that numerosity is a discrete analog
representation. An organism could quite plausibly represent numerical quan-
tity by a discrete number of neural firings; noise in the number—some neurons
fire too much, others too little—would slightly increase or decrease the quan-
tity represented, just as noise introduced into the jar of marbles representing
days since my birthday would only increase (or decrease) the magnitude as a
function of the intensity of the noise. Obviously, how numerosity is actually
represented is an empirical matter; but we should not limit the possibilities
to continuously-varying quantities, as Gallistel suggests.
The last two examples I will mention comes from neuroscience. Recent
work by a number of researchers (e.g. Shu et al. (2006) and Alle and Geiger
(2006)) has cast doubt on the conventional view of neural firing as an “all-
or-none” phenomenon. Instead, the post-synaptic potential invoked by some
neurons may vary as a function of the input received. Neuroscientists describe
this finding as alternately graded, analog, or continuous. The variability is
clearly continuous; what’s not so clear is what this phenomenon has to do
with representation. The relevant neural recordings are all done in vitro: they
are not responses to stimuli given to an organism, but responses to current
induced into cultured neurons by microelectrodes. As one might expect, I
claim we should insist upon calling such phenomena continuous. The point
may seem small, but it is critical that we not import representational capaci-
ties into the activities performed by neural systems until we know that those
activities do, in fact, underlie or implement representations. Much of what
the brain does is likely to be irrelevant to mentality; it is better to be clear
about when such claims are being made, and when they are not.
Finally, Romo et al. (2000) discuss the representation of a vibrating tac-
tile stimulus applied to the fingers of monkeys. Recordings of a particular
neuron show that it fires at a rate varying linearly with the frequency of the
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stimulus. The individual firings of this neuron are discrete, and the number
of firings in a given time represents the stimulus frequency. This is a clear
case of analog representation: whether one thinks of the neural firings as a
discrete number, or the frequency of neural firing as a continuous variable,
it is clear that the representation covaries with what is being represented in
a manner consistent with analog representation as I have proposed. And im-
portantly, we are justified in calling this a representation, as opposed to the
preceding example: the quantity of neural firing is representing the quantity
of a stimulus in the world, presented to an organism.
6 Conclusion
I have presented an analysis of representational types that complicates the
received analog/digital distinction into a four-fold framework. The examples
presented throughout this essay demonstrate the benefit of my proposal. In-
dividual researchers or research programs in the cognitive sciences may not be
confused about what they mean by the terms they use to label phenomena
of interest, but a standard framework for analyzing representational types
across research areas is obviously beneficial. But the benefit of the analysis
goes beyond a mere legislation of terms. It is clear that the essential fea-
ture of analog representation is the relationship between the thing doing the
representing and the thing represented, not just whether continuity is to be
found. Similarly, digital representation is a matter of representing numbers
via digits, and not just an absence of continuity. It should be noted that the
analysis proposed here extends to representations outside of cognitive sci-
ence: digital and analog music recordings and broadcast signals fall in place
as they should. Less obvious examples are covered nicely as well. Consider
dimmer switches, where turning a knob varies the intensity of a light. This
is analog in the received view, because it seems continuous. However, these
devices work by rapidly turning a constant voltage on and off (fast enough
that humans do not perceive any flicker). Maybe these would be digital un-
der the received view, because there are only two voltages. In any case, my
proposal gets the example right: the dimmer switch is analog, because what
matters is the relationship between the light output and the amount that the
knob is turned.
The nature and uses of representation are serious objects of investigation
for many philosophers and cognitive scientists. I have argued in this essay
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for a new way of characterizing representations, which reflects important
dimensions along which they vary. I have also illustrated why it matters
to make the distinctions I have suggested. Given that we do not know how
representation works, we would be wise to avail ourselves of as many different
types of representation as is appropriate. The framework I have argued for in
this essay provides a clear improvement upon the traditional analog/digital
distinction.
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